A moral panic occurs when the behaviour of a group is exaggerated or distorted by the media and wider society, making it appear as a threat to social order or shared values. Those who are blamed or feared are known as folk devils, while those who promote, frame or amplify the panic (such as journalists, politicians or pressure groups) are called moral entrepreneurs. These panics are not just about the behaviour itself, but what that behaviour comes to represent. They often occur at times of social change, economic uncertainty or cultural anxiety, and they frequently focus on youth, race, and the working class. Key sociologists such as Stanley Cohen, Stuart Hall, John Clarke, Jefferson, Dick Hebdige, Sarah Thornton and Owen Jones have shown how moral panics help maintain existing power structures by constructing certain groups as dangerous or inferior, while protecting the status and authority of others.
Late 1940s–1950s: Teddy Boys and Post-War Youth Identity
The Teddy Boys were one of the first major youth subcultures to attract negative media attention. Their distinctive Edwardian-style suits and confident attitudes stood out in a period when Britain was still recovering from war and expected young people to remain obedient and modest. Politicians and newspapers portrayed them as violent and disrespectful, linking them to street fights and “knife gangs.”
Jefferson (1976), working within the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), argued that Teddy Boy style was a way for working-class young men to reclaim lost status during a time when traditional working-class jobs and identities were disappearing. Their fashion and behaviour were expressions of frustration and identity, not just delinquency. However, the media ignored this context and instead created a moral panic that associated working-class youth with disorder. This helped reinforce the idea that the older generation’s values were superior and needed to be defended.
Early–Mid 1960s: Mods and Rockers
Tensions between Mods and Rockers, two distinct youth groups with different fashion and music tastes, came to a head in seaside towns like Brighton in 1964. Newspapers described the events as “riots,” predicting social collapse. In reality, most of the violence was minor and limited, but the media sensationalised it.
Stanley Cohen (1972) analysed this in Folk Devils and Moral Panics, showing how the press exaggerated, distorted and symbolised youth behaviour, turning the Mods and Rockers into moral threats. He described a deviancy amplification spiral, where the reaction to the behaviour increased attention and fear, leading the police, courts and public to treat the groups even more harshly. Cohen’s classic study shows how moral panics tell us more about society’s fears and anxieties than about the behaviour of young people themselves.
Late 1960s–1970s: Skinheads and the ‘Black Mugger’ Panic
During the 1970s, economic decline, unemployment and racial tension provided fertile ground for moral panics. Skinheads, whose culture originally emerged from working-class solidarity and Jamaican ska influences, were recast in the media as violent and racist. At the same time, the figure of the “Black mugger” became a major focus of public fear.
In Policing the Crisis (1978), Stuart Hall et al. demonstrated that the threat of “mugging” was politically constructed. They showed that the government and media exaggerated the problem and framed young Black men as inherently dangerous, which allowed the state to justify harsher policing and control. According to Hall, this panic diverted attention away from deeper structural causes such as unemployment and inequality, and instead located the source of social breakdown in racialised youth. The panic therefore helped maintain existing power relations.
Late 1970s: Punks and Subcultural Shock
In the late 1970s, punk culture appeared with aggressive fashion, loud music and provocative imagery. Newspapers often framed punks as disturbing, disgusting and morally corrupt.
Dick Hebdige (1979) argued in Subculture: The Meaning of Style that punk style was a form of symbolic resistance to consumer culture and class oppression. Items like safety pins and bin bags were re-used in ways that challenged mainstream expectations and mocked authority. However, the media presented these innovations as threatening and dangerous, reinforcing the idea that youth expression equalled deviance. Hebdige showed that subcultural styles are quickly commodified and neutralised once the media and fashion industries absorb them, demonstrating how capitalism handles rebellion.
1980s: Video Nasties and Football Hooliganism
In the early 1980s, new home video technology caused concern that violent films were influencing young people. Campaigners like Mary Whitehouse claimed that “video nasties” encouraged violence and moral decline. This panic led to censorship under the Video Recordings Act (1984). The issue was less about films themselves and more about anxieties regarding changing family roles, media influence and authority.
Football hooliganism, especially among working-class male supporters, also became a central panic. Matches were increasingly policed, fenced and monitored. Once again, working-class masculinity was portrayed as primitive and dangerous, reinforcing class stereotypes and justifying stronger state control.
Late 1980s–Early 1990s: Rave Culture and Ecstasy
Rave culture developed around dance music, all-night parties and the drug ecstasy. Although many participants experienced raves as inclusive, joyful and community-based, the media depicted them as chaotic drug-fuelled gatherings.
Sarah Thornton (1995) argued in Club Cultures that the media played a key role in constructing youth subcultures, shaping how they were understood by wider society. Thornton introduced the term subcultural capital, meaning the status gained from insider knowledge and taste. But politicians and police framed raves as a threat to public order, leading to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994), which banned gatherings with “repetitive beats.” The panic revealed anxieties about youth independence outside adult control.
2000s: Asylum Seekers and Working-Class ‘Yobs’
In the 2000s, tabloid newspapers portrayed asylum seekers as “flooding” the country, draining welfare resources and threatening national identity. At the same time, moral panics developed around so-called “yobs,” including young people associated with hoodies or “chav” culture.
Owen Jones (2011) in Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class argued that these stereotypes allowed governments to blame working-class people for problems caused by austerity, inequality and economic policy. Policies such as ASBOs focused on punishment rather than support, reinforcing social exclusion.
2010s: Riots, Gangs and Online Danger
The 2011 riots were widely framed as evidence of moral collapse, rather than as expressions of anger over inequality, racial injustice and policing. Meanwhile, concerns over cyberbullying, online predators and viral “challenges” created new folk devils in the form of digital youth. Parents, politicians and media acted as moral entrepreneurs, framing the online world as inherently harmful and out of control.
2020s: Knife Crime and Culture Wars
Current debates around knife crime often racialise young Black men as gang members, ignoring the role of austerity, cuts to youth services, school exclusions and poverty. At the same time, public debate has shifted toward “culture wars,” where young people, university students or activists are portrayed as overly sensitive or “too political.” These new panics reflect deep anxieties about identity, tradition and power in a rapidly changing society.
You can download a blank timeline below for students to use to create their own timeline of moral panics in the UK
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